The multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection is a particular example of time-inconsistent problem. In fact, the recent developments in time-inconsistent problems and the revisits of multiperiod meanvariance portfolio selection [1] , [2] , [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] are mutually stimulated. The (single-period) mean-variance formulation initiated by Markowitz [10] is the cornerstone of modern portfolio theory and is widely used in both academic and financial industry. The multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection, which has been extensively studied, is the natural extension of [10] . Until 2000 and for the first time, Li-Ng [9] and Zhou-Li [22] reported the analytical precommitment optimal policies for the discrete-time case and the continuous-time case, respectively.
To proceed, consider a capital market consisting of one riskless asset and m risky assets over a finite time horizon N . Let s k (> 1) be a given deterministic return of the riskless asset at time period k and e k = (e T the vector of random returns of the m risky assets at period k. We assume that vectors e k , k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, are statistically independent and the only information known about the random return vector e k is its first two moments: its mean E(e k ) = (Ee T and its covariance Cov(e k ) = E[(e k − Ee k )(e k − Ee k ) T ]. Clearly, Cov(e k ) is nonnegative definite, i.e., Cov(e k ) 0.
Let X k ∈ R be the wealth of the investor at the beginning of the kth period, and let u (1) where O k is the excess return vector of risky assets [9] T . In this note, we consider the case that short selling is allowed, i.e., u i k , i = 1, . . . , m, take values in R. Let F k = σ(e , = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1), k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} ≡ T with F 0 given by {∅, Ω}. For t ∈ T , denote l 2 F (t; R) = ν t ν t ∈ R is F t -measurable,
where T t = {t, . . . , N − 1}. Then, a time-inconsistent version of multiperiod mean-variance problem [9] is formulated as follows.
Problem (MV):
which is subject to
with μ 1 , μ 2 > 0 being the tradeoff parameters between the mean and variance of the terminal wealth. Furthermore, E t ( · ) above is the conditional mathematical expectation E( · |F t ).
It should be mentioned that Problem (MV) above has two unconventional features: the term μ 1 xE t X N makes J (t, x; u) a state-dependent (or rank-dependent) utility, and the cost functional J (t, x; u) involves nonlinear term of the conditional expectation. It is known that any of the above two features will ruin the time consistency of optimal control, namely, Bellman's principle of optimality will no longer work for Problem (MV). Note that the above model is more general than that of [13] , where the case without μ 1 xE t X N is dealt with.
In [9] , realizing the time inconsistency (called nonseparability there), Li and Ng derived an optimal policy of multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection by using an embedding scheme. The optimal policy of [9] is with respect to the initial pair, i.e., it is optimal only when viewed at the initial time. This scheme is called the precommitted optimal solution now. By applying a precommitted optimal control (for an initial pair), we find that it will no longer be an optimal control for the intertemporal initial pairs. Though the precommitted optimal solution is of some practical and theoretical values, it neglects and has not really addressed the time inconsistency.
In recent years, there is a surge to study the time-inconsistent optimal control together with the revisit to multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] , [7] , [8] , [13] , [14] , [18] , [20] , [21] . Two kinds of time-consistent equilibrium solutions are investigated in these papers including the open-loop equilibrium control and closed-loop equilibrium strategy. To compare, open-loop formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium "control," while the "strategy" is the object of closed-loop formulation. Strotz's equilibrium solution [16] is essentially a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, which is further elaborately developed by Yong to the LQ optimal control [18] , [21] as well as the nonlinear optimal control [17] , [19] , [20] . In contrast, open-loop equilibrium control is extensively studied by Hu et al. [7] , [8] , Yong [21] , Ni-Zhang-Krstic [13] , and Qi-Zhang [14] . In particular, the closedloop formulation can be viewed as the extension of Bellman's dynamic programing, and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if it exists) is derived by a backward procedure [18] [19] [20] [21] . Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized via the maximum-principle-like methodology [7] , [8] , [13] .
It is noted that some nondegenerate assumptions are posed in [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] , and [7] [8] [9] . Specifically, the volatilities of the stocks in [1] , [2] , [7] , and [8] and the return rates of the risky securities in [4] , [5] , and [9] are assumed to be nondegenerate, i.e., Cov(e k ) 0, k ∈ T . To make the formulation more practical, it is natural to consider, at least in theory, how to generalize these results to the case where degeneracy is allowed. In fact, mean-variance portfolio selection problems with degenerate covariance matrices may date back to the 1970s. In [3] or the "corrected" version [15] , Buser proposes the single-period version with possibly singular covariance matrix. Clearly, such class of problems are more general than the classical ones [10] , and more consistent with the reality.
In this note, we do not pose the nondegenerate assumption and want to find the conditions such that the time-consistent equilibrium solutions of Problem (MV) exist. This can be done by using the theory developed by [12] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the definitions of equilibrium solutions, whose existence is investigated in Section III. In Section IV, an example of [9] is revisited.
II. EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS
In the following, we introduce three equilibrium solutions for Problem (MV), which are the open-loop equilibrium control, feedback equilibrium strategy and mixed equilibrium solution. Note that the following notions are consistent with those of [12] . Throughout this note, Problem (MV) for the initial pair (t, x) will be simply denoted as Problem (MV) tx . Definition 2.1:
for any k ∈ T t and any
are the restrictions of u t,x on T k and T k + 1 , respectively; and X t,x , * is given by
is called an admissible feedback strategy (or simply a feedback strategy) if for any
The set of such type of f k s is denoted by F k , and 
In (3),
where X t,x , * , X k ,u k are as follows:
If Ψ and γ do not depend on x, and ψ of i) equals to (Ψ, γ), namely 
In (4),
where X t,x , * and X k ,u k are defined by
ii) Φ and v t,x in i) are called, respectively, the pure-feedback-strategy part and the open-loop-control part of the mixed equilibrium solution 
Furthermore, it is valuable to mention that v t,x 's in both sides of (4) are the same. This is why we call Φ the pure-feedbackstrategy part and v t,x the open-loop-control part.
III. CHARACTERIZATION ON THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS
To solve Problem (MV) tx , we shall transform (1) into a linear controlled system with multiplicative noises so that the general theory [12] can work. Precisely, define
T , k ∈ T } is a martingale difference sequence as e k , k = 0, . . . , N − 1, are statistically independent. Furthermore,
This leads to 
Proof: This result is proved according to [12, Th. 3.11] . In this case, [12, Th. 3.11, eqs 
where
By some calculations, we have
otherwise, it will be 0. Therefore
This together with π k = 0, U k = 0, k ∈ T implies that the solvability of (7)- (9) is equivalent to the property 
and
are solvable, namely
with
Then, (10) and (11) are solvable; for any t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R), (Φ t , v t ) with
are given in (12).
Proof: Note that (10) can be equivalently rewritten as
We now prove that (10) and (11) are solvable. For a generic k ∈ T , we prove the conclusion by the following two cases.
Case 1: (13) is solvable at k. Similarly
which implies the solvability of (11) at k.
which further implies U k + 1 = 0 and L k = 0; hence, (13) is solvable at k. Furthermore, (14) implies
From this and (14), we have β k + 1 = 0 and π k + 1 = 0, and hence (11) is solvable at k under the condition of S k + 1 = 0, S k + 2 > 0. Finally, if S k + 2 = 0, we must have some τ > k + 1 such that S τ = 0, S τ + 1 > 0. Similar to the comments below (14), we have U τ = β τ = π τ = 0, which implies U k + 1 = 0 and the solvability of (13) 
Hence, (11) is solvable at k. In summary, for a generic k ∈ T , we have proved the solvability of (11) and (13) [12, Th. 3.13] and Theorem 3.2, we can complete the proof.
Theorem 3.4: Let Cov(O k ) 0, k ∈ T . Then, for any t ∈ T and any x ∈ l 2 F (t; R), Problem (MV) tx admits a unique feedback equilibrium strategy, which is given by (Φ t , v t ) with
Proof: In this case, (10) and (11) are solvable. From (13), we know that S k > 0, k ∈ T . In fact, suppose S k 0 = 0 and S k 0 + 1 = 0 for some k 0 ∈ T , then
This is impossible, and thus S k > 0, k ∈ T .
Furthermore, we have O k 0, k ∈ T . We now consider the mixed equilibrium portfolio solution. In this case, [12, eq. (3.26 
From (15) and (16), we obtain
For the case Cov(O k ) 0, k ∈ T , we have shown in the proof of Theorem 3.4 that S k > 0, k ∈ T . Noting (13), (18), and (19), we could select Φ by the continuity such that S k + T k > 0, Δ ≥ 0, k ∈ T , and hence O k , k ∈ T are invertible. As for any k ∈ T , O k 0, we know that (15) is solvable. By [12, Th. 3.14] , the following result is straightforward. (16) and (17) are solvable, and let
is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (MV) tx . Remark 3.1: Mixed equilibrium solution is studied in this paper, by which we can investigate the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy in a unified way. Importantly, the mixed equilibrium solution is not a hollow concept. In an example of [12] , it is shown that neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for the initial pair (t, x) with t = 0, 1 and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R 2 ), although we are able to construct ten mixed equilibrium solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to study the mixed equilibrium solution, which gives us more flexibility to deal with the time-inconsistent control.
IV. AN EXAMPLE
Consider a multiperiod mean-variance portfolio selection problem. A capital market consists of one riskless asset and three risky assets over a finite time horizon N = 4, and the parameters of the model are as follows: In this paper, we assume μ 1 = μ 2 = 0.2. Clearly 
Feedback equilibrium strategy By (10), (11) , and some calculations, we have 
Then, the unique feedback equilibrium strategy is given by
Mixed equilibrium solution
Frankly speaking, up to now we have not yet got the quantitative result about what kind of Φ s will make (16) and (17) be solvable, but for any given Φ we can check the solvability of (16) and (17) . So, here we would like to select Φ by using the command "randn" of MATLAB and check whether it is the pure-feedback-strategy part of a mixed equilibrium solution. Specifically, use "randn" to generate 4 Φ s with For each φ, all the eigenvalues of O k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are nonzero; this means that O k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all invertible. Therefore, the corresponding (16) and (17) are solvable. In addition, (15) is clearly solvable. From Proposition 3.1, we know that for all the above four cases the mixed equilibrium solutions exist. For example, with the first φ above, the mixed equilibrium solution is as follows. Let Furthermore, by results of [9] and [11] , we have the following precommitted optimal control u 0 ,x p :
P N = 1, k = 0, 1, 2, 3. For k = 0, 1, 2, 3, define the expected values under the four policies 
